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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
- - - - - - - - -
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) 
Plaintiff & Respondent,) 
) 
-vs- ) Case No. 11320 
) 
DONALD JOE THORNTON, ) 
) 
Defendant & Appellant. ) 
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Appeal from a conviction of rape in viola-
tion of Section 76-53-15, Utah Code Annotated 
( 195 3) . 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant-Appellant was ~harged with the 
crime of rape. Jury trial was had before Honor-
able Charles G. Cowley, in the Second Judicial 
District on February 29, 1968. The Defendant 
was found guilty and, on April 15, 1968, was 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term 
of not less than ten years, which could be for 
life. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks a reversal of the 
judgment entered by the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Appellant, Donald Joe Thornton, 
age 20, who has an IQ of 68 with severe characte~ 
logical and personality problems (R. 6), who can 
neither read (T. 128, 184) nor write (T.220), and 
who went only to the third grade in the public 
school system (T. 206), was arrested by OgdenCit'1 
Pol ice at about 4:00 P.M. on November 27, 1967, or 
suspicion of rape and taken to the Ogden City 
Police Station for interrogation (T. 62,68). 
Donald was placed in an interrogation room~ 
pol ice headquarters (T. 92) and, after being read 
the Miranda Warnings (T. 64), was interrogated by 
the arresting officer. He made no indication t~I 
he understood the warnings (T. 93) nor did the 
interrogating officer make any effort to ascertai~ 
whether he understood. In fact, the arresting 
officer testified that he merely assumed that t~ 
defendant understood. (T. 72). 
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Donald did not confess to the crime when first 
interrogated but did make certain incriminating 
statements which were used against him at trial 
(T. 67). After a period of time another officer 
relieved the arresting officer in the interrogating 
room and, after reading the Miranda Warnings for a 
second time, continued the interrogation. Several 
more hours of questioning took place and a signed 
statement was finally obtained (T. 85). 
The purported statement was compiled from 
answers that Donald gave to questions by the inter-
rogating officer (T. 134). The questions asked by 
the officer were not recorded (T. 138). The sten-
ographer who took down the statement testified that 
it was a combination of statements by the defendant, 
Donald Thornton, and details from pol ice records 
supplied by the interrogating officer (T. 148). 
Examination of Donald at trial shows that he 
was incapable of coping with the simple facts of 
everyday I ife. For example, he testified that 
"there are around nine days in a week11 (T. 180); 
that the letters in the alphabet are ·~. B, C, D, 
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E, -- 1, J, K11 and "that's as far as I know" 
(T. 188); that the month was 11May 11 when actual 
it was March (T. 180); when asked the differen: 
in value between twenty cents and twenty-fi~ 
cents, 11that it [the quarter] is this much bi~: 
(indicating the diameter with his hand) (T. I& 
and that the name of the street where he liv~ 
the only one in Ogden which he knew (T. 192, 1. 
Donald was found guilty largely on theba! 
of his incriminating statements and confessioo 
which were allowed into evidence over defendan: 
attorney's vigorous objections. 
ARGUMENTS 
PO I NT I 
CERTAIN SAFEGUARDS MUST BE MET BEFORE om 
DANT 1 S STATEMENTS, WHETHER EXCULPATORY OR INC~l 
TORY, MAY BE USED BY THE PROSECUTION. 
In the landmark decision of Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. 
1602 (1966) the Supreme Court held: 
[T]he prosecution may not use statements'. 
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemrn1n: 
from custodial interrogation of the defenda' 
unless it demonstrates the use of procedure 
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safeguards effective to secure the privilege 
against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 444. 
The court went on to set out the procedural 
safeguards required. It stated: 
[T]hat prior to any questioning, the person must 
be warned that he has a right to remain silent, 
that any statement he does make may be used as 
evidence against him, and that he has a right 
to the presence of an attorney either retained 
or appointed. 384 U.S. at 444. 
Also, Miranda, supra, provides that the warn-
ing is necessary to ~ake the defendant aware not 
only of the privilege, but also of the consequences 
of foregoing it. Moreover, the court said that 
defendant's right to remain silent and to be repre-
sented by counsel could be waived only if such 
waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently. (emphasis supplied) 
In Miranda, supra, as well as in other cases, 
the Supreme Court has held that when interrogation 
of a defendant continues without the presence of 
an attorney, and a statement is taken, a heavy 
burden rests upon the government to demonstrate 
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently 
waived his privilege against self-incrimination and 
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his right to counsel. Escabedo v. 111 inois, 378 
U. S. 478, 490, note 14, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 986, 
84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 475, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 
(1966). 
The court in Miranda, supra, said: 
[U]nless and until such warnings and waiver 
are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, 
no evidence obtained as a resu It of i nterroga· 
tion can be used against him. 384 U.S. 479. 
PO I NT 11 
DEFENDANT IN THE CASE AT BAR DID NOT VOLUN· 
TARILY, KNOWINGLY, AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVE HIS 
RIGHTS TO REMAIN SILENT AND TO BE REPRESENTED~ 
COUNSEL, AND AS A RESULT HIS STATEMENTS ARE 
I NADM I SS IBLE AND HIS CONVICT I ON MUST BE REVERSED. 
The Supreme Court held in Miranda, supra, 
that the defendant must waive his rights~-
tarily, knowingly, and intelligently and that a 
heavy burden rests upon the state to show that tni 
defendant did so. (emphasis supplied). 
As the court stated in State v. ~. 438 
P. 2d 185 (1968): 
hi 
7 
We recognize that in cases prior to Miranda we 
were primarily concerned with the voluntariness 
of the confession, whereas after Miranda, we 
must, in addition, consider whether the accused 
was informed of his constitutional rights and 
whether he thereafter knowingly and intelli-
gently waived these rights prior to making the 
statement. 
The waiver of constitutional rights, according 
to the United States Supreme Court, must be volun-
tary, and every reasonable presumption is indulged 
against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights 
of one charged with a crime. ~ v. Michigan, 
355 U.S. 155, 2 L. Ed. 2d 167, 78 S. Ct. 191 (1957); 
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 L. Ed. 
680, 62 S. Ct. 457. 
Whether the defendant in this case voluntarily, 
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to 
remain silent and to counsel must be resolved upon 
the whole record. People v. ~. 432 P. 2d 207, 
(1967). 
The courts have said that the accused's intel-
ligence, character, age, and situation at the time 
of the confession are important factors to be 
considered in resolving the question of knowledgable 
and intelligent waiver. ~ v. State of Alabama, 
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202 So. 2d 539 (1967); People v. Lara, supra. 
A review of the record in this case indicates 
that the defendant did not have the menta I capaciti 
to 11 intel l igently 11 and 11knowingly 11 waive his con-
stitutional rights. The psychiatric report on t~ 
defendant• Dona 1 d Thornton, showed that he had an 
IQ of 68 (R. 6), (T. 169), with characterlogical 
and personality problems. In Oakes v. Pattersen, 
278 Fed. Supp. 703, (USDC, D. Colo. 1968), the 
court took note that where the defendant had an IQ 
of 76 that he had a menta I age of roughly 12 years, 
Again in People v. ~. supra, the Supre:ne Court 
of Cal i forn i a noted that where the defendant 1 s IQ 
was between 65-71 that he had a menta I age of about 
JO years and two months. By way of repetition t~ 
defendant's IQ was reported to be 68. 
Because of the defendant's mental inabilities 
he attended public school only to the third gra~ 
(T. 206), any subsequent schoo Jing was obtained at, 
special schools for the 11slow learner" in Ogden ani 
American Fork (T. 207). The transcript shows that 
i the defendant could neither read (T. 128, 184, 20 
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nor write (T. 220). He did not know the alphabet 
(T. 188), nor the relative value of money (T. 184, 
208). 
It is important to note that the defendant 
did not know the names of any streets in Ogden 
other than the one on which he lived (T. 192,208), 
this in 1 ight of the fact that his purported state-
ments referred to specific streets other than the 
one on which he I ived. 
Defendant 1 s testimony also indicates that he 
did not know the number of days in the week or the 
month of the year (T. 180). Defendant•s trial was 
held in March, but when the defendant was asked 
what month it was he said he thought it was May. 
(T. 180). 
The record also indicates a general inability 
to understand and respond to questions, as was 
indicated by counsel 1s question to defendant as to 
the difference in value between twenty cents and a 
quarter, to which the defendant responded by 
indicating with his hand how much larger a quarter 
was in terms of physical size (T. 184). 
l 0 
In People v. Lara, supra, the defendant was 
charged with murder, along with another man. In 
that case, which is distinguishable from the case 
at bar, the confession of the defendant was all~1 
in despite the fact that defendant 1 s IQ was repor1 
ed as being between 65-71. In admitting the con· 
fession the court placed great weight on the 
following facts: that the defendant had gone to 
the ninth or tenth grade in school, that he could 
read and write, and that he stated to the co-
defendant that he would act dumb if given an IQ 
test. The court al so took note of the defendant 15 
display of craftiness as evidenced by his wanting 
to speak with the co-defendant before making any 
statement and by his trying to make a deal with 
the pol ice. Also, the defendant had had numeroos 
previous "deal ings 11 with the pol ice and was famil· 
iar with pol ice interrogation procedure. 
By way of contrast the defendant in the case 
at bar, because of his limited mental capacity, 
attended public school only to the third grade. 
His IQ tested at 68. He could neither read nor 
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write, and the record indicates that he had diffi-
culty understanding questions posed to him by 
counsel. Also, there is no evidence of any craft-
iness on the part of the defendant nor any evidence 
that he had had previous dealings with the pol ice 
so as to put him at ease in pol ice surroundings. 
The author asserts that because of defendant's 
limited mental capacity he was unable to intelli-
gently and knowingly waive his constitutional rights 
and as a result his statements were inadmissible 
and his conviction must be reversed. 
POI NT 111 
DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION WAS NOT VOLUNTARY AND 
THEREFORE NOT ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM. 
In Hayes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513, 
10 L. Ed. 2d 513, 83 S. Ct. 1336 (1963), the 
Supreme Court held: 
In determining the voluntariness of a confes-
sion of crime, the question in each case is 
whether the defendant's will was overborne at 
the time he confessed. 
The District Court in Gilbert v. ~. 274 F. Supp. 
847 (USDC, S.D. Texas, 1967), in applying this 
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standard stated that the question was to be decideo 
By weighing the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the making of the confession and 
evaluating their probable effect on the con-
fessor, with his pec.uliar weaknesses and 
strengths. 
Courts have consistently held that mental 
retardation or subnorma I i nte l 1 i gence weighs heavil, 
against a finding of capacity to :nake a voluntary 
confession. Mal lot v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 
I L. Ed 2d 1479, 77 S. Ct. 1356 (1957); Elrod v. 
State of A I abama, 202 So. 2d 539 (I 967); People v. 
~. 432 P. 2d 207 (1967); Ford v. State of 
Oklaho:na, 430 P. 2d 838 (1967); Oaks v. Patterson, 
278 F. Supp. 703 (USDC, D. Colo. 1968); Gilbertv. 
~' 274 F. Supp. 847, (USDC, S.D. Texas 1968). 
The defendant here has an IQ of 68 with a 
mental age of around JO or 11. He has only a thira 
grade education and can neither read nor write. 
The record shows that the defendant was pickea 
up by po I ice at about 4: 00 P. M. on November 27, 19b; 
(T. 62). From that time unt i I about 8: 30 or 9:00 
P.M. (T. 68), a period of four or five hours, the 
defendant was continuously questioned by two differ' 
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officers (T. 68, 92) and as a result the defendant 
finally broke down. 
The two police officers testified that the 
defendant made statements to them referring to 
Specific streets in the c"1ty of Ogden (T 67 95 . , ' 
119). Testimony in other parts of the records 
shows that the defendant only knew the name of the 
street on which he 1 ived. (T. 192, 208). Mrs. Rude, 
a senior stenographer for the Ogden Police Depart-
ment testified that the confession was not in the 
defendant 1 s m"'n words and that it a I so contained 
details filled in by Officer Scott from Police 
Records. (T. 148). Mrs. Rude also stated that the 
interrogation was conducted by asking the defendant 
questions and that only the defendant's answers 
were taken down. (T. 138). 
The defendant testified that he was told by 
the officer questioning him that if he would sign 
the statement that he could go home. (T 187). This 
fact, when taken in context with the rest of the 
record and in light of the defendant's limited 
intelligence, militates against any claim on the 
l~ 
part of the state that the defendant 1 s statementi 
were voluntary. 
Consequently, for the above reasons the Stat' 
has not sustained its burden of showing that the 
defendant 1 S statements were voluntary arid therefr 
they were not admissible in evidence and his coo· 
viction must be reversed. 
POINT IV 
THE STATE HAS NOT SUSTAINED ITS BURDEN OF 
SHOWING A VOLUNTARY, KNOWING, AND INTELLIGENT 
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS REQUIRED ~m 
DECISION IN MIRANDA V. ARIZONA, SUPRA. 
The Record shows that 0 ff ice r Donnely, the 
officer who initially picked up the defendant, 
read 
him. 
him the Miranda Warnings before i nterrogatin:i 
However, the record is barren of any indico·! 
I 
tion that the defendant understood the warningsm 
knowingly waived them. (T. 93). In fact, the 
i 
officer testified that he merely assumed that the' 
defendant understood. (T. 72). 
The Miranda Court specifically held that~ 
statements obtained from a defendant while in 
r' 
·I 
;·! 
I 
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custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in 
any significant way would be admissible in evidence 
unless the defendant had been informed of his rights 
and had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently 
waived them. Moreover, the court went on to hold 
that a heavy burden rested on the state to show such 
a waiver and that waiver would not be presumed from 
a silent record. 
At page 475 of the United States Supreme Court 
Reports the court said: 
[A] val id waiver will not be presumed simply 
from the silence of the accused after warnings 
are given or simply from the fact that a con-
fession was in fact eventually obtained ••.• 
The record must show or there must be an 
allegation and evidence that the warnings were 
given and that the defendant intelligently and 
understandingl~waived them. Anything Jess is 
not waiver. 3 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 
724, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966) [emphasis supplied]. 
The Miranda decisions specifically require that, 
or once the defendant has been taken into custody or 
deprived of his freedom in any significant way, the 
i 
e' required warnings and waiver must be given before 
~questioning takes place. (emphasis supplied). 
For that reason any warnings which are given sub-
sequent to the initial questioning are immaterial. 
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The Record in the case at bar does not sh~ 
that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently waived his constitutional rights, 
and as a result the statements of the defendant 
to Officers Donnelly and Scott, as well as his 
subsequent confession, are inadmissible and his 
conviction must be reversed. 
PO I NT IV 
STATEMENTS ALLOWED INTO EVIDENCE WHICH 
VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS AS PROCED~ 
SET FORTH IN MI RANDA V. AR I ZONA, SUPRA, ARE NOT 
HARMLESS ERROR. 
Miranda, supra, specifically holds that befo 
any statement of the defendant can be used a¥im 
him the prosecution must demonstrate that the 
required warnings and waiver have been given. Al 
three cases considered by the court in Miranda 
were reversed when the court found that the a~~ 
requirements were not met. 
When involuntary confessions have been intr1 
duced at trial, the court has always reversed 
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convictions regardless of other evidence of guilt. 
Lynumn v. 111 inois, 372 U.S. 528, 9 L.Ed. 2d 922, 
83 S.Ct. 917 (1963); Malinski v. New York, 324 
U.S. 401, 89 L.Ed. 1029, 65 S.Ct. 781; Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L.Ed. 2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 
824 (1967) concurring opinion Mr. Justice Stewart; 
Miranda v. Arizona, supra. 
As the court in the cases clted above 
indicates, the right to remain silent and the 
right to be represented by counsel are considered 
so fundamental that any infringement of them, 
however slight, requires reversal. 
The statements of the defendant allowed into 
evidence over defendant's objection in this case 
violated his right to remain silent and to be 
represented by counsel as guaranteed by the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion, and his conviction must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments presented in this brief 
the State did not sustain its burden of showing 
that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and 
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voluntarily waived his right to remain silent ano 
to be represented by counsel, and as a result 
statements introduced into evidence were inadmis· 
sible and his conviction must be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON 
WEBER COUNTY BAR LEGAL 
SERVICES 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appe 11 ant 
203 24th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
